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Abstract
Th e passage of Bill C-31 into Canadian law in June 2012 
is part of a discourse created around refugees by the cur-
rent Government of Canada. Refugees are divided into 
“good and proper” refugees who live in camps abroad, and 
the “ fraudulent and bogus” refugees who claim asylum at 
the Canadian border. Th e new act, Bill C-31 or Protecting 
Canada’s Immigration System Act, is analyzed with respect 
to changes that will result in the systematic exclusion of 
certain groups of asylum seekers from Canada, based on 
these discourses of “bogus” and “ fraud,” even though these 
groups may include genuine refugees. Drawing on the case 
of Czech Roma refugee claimants who come to Canada 
from Europe, this article shows how the Roma come to 
stand for the perfect “bogus” refugee—a person who wants 
to cheat the benevolent Canadian system without hav-
ing grounds for a successful refugee status application. A 
critical look at the legislation provides new insights into 
the relations between governmentality and the regimes 
of citizenship, with the state performing its power in 
increasingly spectacular ways. Refugees act as the abject 
Other that legitimizes, legalizes, and reaffi  rms such state 
interventions.
Résumé
L’adoption du projet de loi C-31 en juin 2012 fait partie 
d’un discours créé par le gouvernement actuel du Canada 
autour des réfugiés. Ceux-ci sont divisés en « bons et justes » 
réfugiés qui vivent dans des camps à l’étranger et réfugiés 
« bidon et frauduleux » qui demandent l’asile à la frontière 
canadienne. La nouvelle loi, le projet de loi C-31 ou Loi 
visant à protéger le système d’immigration du Canada, est 
analysée en fonction de changements qui se traduiront par 
l’exclusion systématique du Canada de certains groupes de 
demandeurs d’asile, sur la base de ces notions de « bidon » 
et « fraude », même si ces groupes peuvent comprendre de 
véritables réfugiés. S’appuyant sur le cas de demandeurs 
d’asile roms tchèques venus d’Europe au Canada, cet article 
montre comment les Roms en viennent à incarner le réfu-
gié « bidon » idéal — quelqu’un qui veut abuser de la bien-
veillance du système canadien en déposant une demande 
de statut de réfugié sans fondement. Un regard critique sur 
le projet de loi apporte un nouvel éclairage sur les relations 
entre la gouvernementalité et les régimes de citoyenneté, où 
l’état exerce son pouvoir de façon de plus en plus spectacu-
laire. Le réfugié tient lieu d’Autre abject qui légitime, léga-
lise, et réaffi  rme les interventions de l’État.
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Introduction
Th e recent changes made to Canada’s refugee determina-
tion system and the hardening of attitudes toward refugees 
has placed certain asylum seekers squarely at the forefront 
of nation-building projects. By equating refugees with 
“the Other,” the fi gure of the asylum seeker becomes the 
vehicle through which the performance of sovereignty can 
be enacted, as the state promulgates a particular discourse 
about those who appear to be threatening state borders. 
Th is article examines the discourses that have been circu-
lated about refugee claimants by the current Conservative 
Government of Canada and how such discourses create a 
binary between the “good” refugees who remain in refugee 
camps until they are brought to Canada as government-
assisted refugees (GARs), and the bad or “bogus” refugees 
who autonomously arrive at Canada’s shores, seeking asy-
lum of their own volition.1 Th is dichotomy is used to bol-
ster the rhetoric of the benevolent and welcoming Canadian 
refugee system trying to cope with “fraudulent” asylum 
claimants clogging the process. Th e February 2012 intro-
duction and December 2012 implementation of Bill C-31, 
fully named Th e Act to Amend the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act, the Balanced Refugee Reform Act, the 
Marine Transportation Security Act and the Department of 
Citizenship and Immigration, is in line with the worldwide 
trend toward the securitization of asylum and the enhanced 
policing of borders. In order to illustrate these discourses 
and their impact on a particular group of asylum seekers, 
it is useful to consider how Roma refugee claimants have 
been systematically presented as the embodiment of bogus 
refugees and denied refugee status.
For the purposes of this article, the designations Roma 
and Romani will be used, as they are generally seen as a self-
appointed term by the Roma community in Canada. Th e 
term refugee must also be used critically. I examine the treat-
ment of those who have self-identifi ed as refugees in order 
to qualify for the Canadian refugee assessment process and 
have thus been designated as an entity that is treated in par-
ticular ways in Canadian immigration policy. Th us, I will 
be looking at Roma refugee claimants, not Roma refugees, in 
order avoid making judgments about whether or not they 
are bona fi de refugees. Th e Roma are not geographically 
bounded, and in this article they are defi ned as a “group” 
based on their grounds for applying for refugee status in 
Canada as Czech nationals. I chose to focus on the Czech 
Roma in particular because their migration to Canada has 
been historically complicated by visa impositions. While 
their numbers are less than other groups of Roma who 
come to Canada seeking refugee status, the Czech Roma 
provide a representative subset of the population that has 
been seized on by the government and equated with being 
“bogus” and “fraudulent” refugees. While all Roma refu-
gee claimants have been experiencing diffi  culties with the 
refugee determination system, the Czech Roma provide 
an interesting example of how government action against 
a particular group can crystallize in specifi c state mechan-
isms, such as visa imposition and safe-country lists. Czech 
Roma claimants come from a country deemed democratic 
and safe, a country seen as not “typically” producing refu-
gees. Th ey oft en abandon their refugee claim and either 
return to the Czech Republic or else enter another country 
in the European Union. Canada has also imposed numer-
ous travel visas on the Czech Republic since the 1990s, in 
order to stem undesirable migration into Canada.2 Th us they 
are construed as the perfect “bogus” refugees—persons who 
want to cheat the benevolent Canadian system without hav-
ing grounds for a successful refugee status application.
Th is article provides a brief history of the Roma in Europe, 
followed by a short analysis of the Canadian immigration 
and refugee regime. I then examine the recent changes made 
to Canadian legislation and statements by the government 
concerning the Roma that have been made to bolster these 
changes. Th is article argues that the utilization of such loaded 
terms as bogus and fraud is done deliberately to bolster state 
sovereignty as the refugee regime increasingly moves toward 
a “guilty until proven innocent” model, with any semblance 
of a fair refugee determination process transformed into an 
uncovering of those claimants who are “bogus” and out to 
cheat the benevolent Canadian system.
Literature Review
While there are studies on Roma migration in the European 
Union, such as in the United Kingdom,3 there are signifi cant 
gaps in anthropological literature examining Roma popula-
tions in Canada. Broader literature concerning migration, 
in particular by Malkki,4 Clark-Kazak,5 Giles,6 Hyndman,7 
and Winland8 orients our understanding of refugee issues, 
state sovereignty, and regimes of control. Further work has 
been done on state-sovereignty and discourse formation 
and the impacts of the practices of the sovereign nation 
on migrants and refugees. Billig9 examines the recurrent 
practices, banal routines, experiences, and discourses of 
the nation, and Gullestad10 analyzes how social imagin-
aries aff ect how the public thinks about collective soci-
eties and social values. Vertovec11 explores how identity is 
inherently tied to borders and their control.12 Th e particu-
lar regimes that have been employed to regulate migration 
have also been extensively explored,13 and while these par-
ticular mechanisms are beyond the scope of this article, it is 
important to note that border surveillance is inherently tied 
to projects of sovereignty. In Bill C-31, the ramped up sur-
veillance and policing of borders is evident in the creation of 
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the “irregular arrivals” category and the subsequent man-
datory detentions for these claimants.14 Th e assemblages of 
knowledge that frame government interventions surround-
ing immigrants have also been explored by Blommaert.15 
Th ere are clear political reactions to the infl ux of migrants, 
and ideas of ethnicity and racialization impinge on the 
bodies of refugees and asylum seekers.16 Migrant identities 
and the relationships between migration, citizenship, and 
the state have been widely studied,17 and theorists such 
as Ahmed, Morris, Buck-Morss, Balibar, and Stewart and 
Harding18 explore the state responses to the aff ective impact 
of the refugee and alien fi gure. In this environment, certain 
language and symbols come to be used to mobilize concerns 
about foreigners, such as the formulation of the “bogus” or 
“fraudulent” refugee, which can be seen in the rhetoric sur-
rounding Roma refugee claimants and Bill C-31.19
When examining the discourses around Roma migrants 
in particular, the works of linguist and Roma scholar Ian 
Hancock20 and Ronald Lee21 have been particularly help-
ful, as discourses surrounding the Roma population are 
historical. Th is particular population has been scapegoated 
and used in nation-making projects in Europe for centuries. 
In literature that concerns the Roma in Canada specifi cally 
from a social work perspective, Walsh and Krieg examine 
how Roma families are disadvantaged in numerous systems 
of governance, such as in social support.22 I show this to 
also hold true for systems of refugee determination systems. 
Butler’s 2009 work foreshadowed the binary conceptualiza-
tion for legitimate/illegitimate refugees in Canada and dis-
cussed the possible consequences of imposing “safe” coun-
try lists on Roma claimants, thus intensifying the notion 
that Roma are “bogus” refugees.23 Th ere is also discussion 
of how increased ministerial discretion will aff ect Canadian 
refugee determination systems and how certain groups of 
refugees are seen as less deserving of having access to asy-
lum adjudication.24 Liew in particular examines Canada’s 
country-of-origin lists and the problematic consequences 
of “legitimate” refugee defi nition based on these lists.25 Th e 
perils of Canada’s “safe lists” have also been examined.26 
Kernerman shows how these forms of governance under-
lie Canada’s motivations to keep certain populations from 
being able to access Canada’s supposed humanitarian refu-
gee policies through interdiction techniques and messages 
that only legitimate refugees are welcome.27 Dauverge in 
particular provides a thorough examination of how binar-
ies are used in legal defi nitions by the state to fi lter certain 
populations out and keep migration in line with Western 
nationalist projects.28
Th is article builds on this lively debate and presents an 
analysis of what these “fraudulent claimant” discourses 
about the Roma can reveal about state power over citizens 
and non-citizens that is exerted by the sovereign state. 
Applying theories of state performativity to Bill C-31 shows 
how the persistent usage of the “bogus” refugee image bol-
sters the state’s hard-line provisions in nation building pro-
jects. Th e fi gure of the immigrant poses a particular threat 
to the sovereign nation,29 yet it can also be used to justify 
increased intervention and securitization of the immigra-
tion and refugee regime. Th e discourses that surround 
Roma refugee claimants and the strength with which the 
designations of the “fraudulent” and “bogus” refugee stick 
to this particular group needs to be explored through the 
lens of discourse formation at the state level. Th eir prom-
ulgation through legislation, offi  cial statements, and media 
portrayals gives particular discursive formations their sali-
ence and truthfulness.30 Discourse formations work pre-
cisely because they shape people’s realities, and their under-
standing of their and of the Others’ place in the world. Th e 
perception of the public appears to be greatly infl uenced by 
policy and laws and the state portrayal of asylum seekers 
as “bogus” claimants whose “fraudulent” nature must be 
uncovered.
Th is is not to imply that consumers of public images are 
without agency and are blindly taken in by these discourses. 
Discourses are examined and refl ected upon, yet their power 
lies precisely in their ability to constitute what is deemed 
to be the “truth.” Rather than telling people how to behave, 
certain ideas become ingrained as the norm, especially if 
the discussion is framed as a matter of national security 
and protecting Canada from being fl eeced by unwelcome 
and undesirable outsiders. When refugee claimants are 
presumed guilty of fraud and denied due process and fair 
refugee status determination, more bona fi de claimants will 
be denied asylum. Th is new legislation will also arguably 
set a precedent for further conservative legislation aff ect-
ing Canadian immigration policy and alter Canada’s stand-
ing in international refugee law. A critical look at Bill C-31 
provides insights into the relations between state sover-
eignty and the regimes of citizenship, with refugees acting 
as the abject Other that legitimizes, codifi es, and reaffi  rms 
state interventions. With the notion of state sovereignty in 
fl ux, Western governments are increasingly turning to dis-
courses of threat at the borders to justify increasingly hard-
line measures. By controlling the movement of citizen and 
non-citizen bodies, setting up systems of interdiction and 
increased security at the border, and dwelling on the need to 
protect fragile economies from invading outside forces, gov-
ernments are able to bolster state sovereignty with the sup-
port of the majority of the citizen-subject populace under 
the “truth” that this is justifi ed and for the greater good of 
the weakened nation-state. In examining the power rela-
tions surrounding refugee claimants and their treatment 
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in state discourse, this article hopes to insert itself into the 
important debates surrounding the precarity of state sover-
eignty and the regimes of truth and power that modern 
states employ in order to strengthen their projects of control.
From “Gypsy” to “Roma”: Brief History of the 
Roma in Europe and Canada
Th e term Roma is oft en overused and it can homogenize 
a varied population whose movements have spanned the 
globe over the centuries. Th e Roma are not a unifi ed group, 
and some argue that there are four distinct groups: the 
Kalderash, Machvaiya, Churaria, and Lovara “who share 
the Romanes language [but] diff er in customs, beliefs, trad-
itional laws and ceremonies.”31 While there is much dissent 
about and criticism of the all-encompassing label Roma32 it 
has been adopted by many Roma as an identity marker over 
the other widely used and oft en derogatory terms such as 
Gypsy or Czigan.33
Th e Roma expanded out of India and into Europe in 
the 11th century following the expansion of the Ghaznavid 
Empire. For nearly as long as the Roma have moved out of 
India and entered Europe, they have endured widespread 
persecution and systematic racism and, as some authors 
and activists argue, “based on the defi nitions produced by 
the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
in 1951,34 the treatment of Roma in Europe is characterized 
by an egregious racism clearly recognizable as systemic 
in nature and thus qualifi es them as refugees.”35 Indeed, 
Roma persecution is not an isolated, present-day phenom-
enon, and European history is replete with examples of sys-
tematic persecution and racism. In 16th-century Britain, 
Roma travellers faced abuse and ill-treatment,36 while 
persecution in 18th-century France was legalized through 
widespread court orders to hang Roma men and wilfully 
maim women and children.37 Ear cutting, branding, and 
lynching were widespread methods of marking and exe-
cuting the Roma.38 A more recent example of systematic 
persecution that led to planned extermination of great 
swaths of the Roma population was the Holocaust during 
the Second World War, and “mass internment of Roma at 
Camps in Dusseldorf, Buchenwald, Auschwitz and else-
where began in 1940, a period known as the Porajmos (the 
Romany word for ‘the Devouring’).”39 “Over the course of 
the war estimates of Roma deaths range between 0.5 and 
1.5 million, representing 70–80% of their European popu-
lation,”40 a staggering percentage indicative of purpose-
ful ethnic cleansing. Th e Czech and Moravian Roma were 
essentially annihilated during the Second World War,41 
and the total loss of life in the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
was approximately 250,000 persons. Aft er the war and 
in the rise of Communism in Eastern Europe behind the 
Iron Curtain, there appears to have been a suppression of 
direct attacks against the Roma. However, the Roma were 
forced to give up their livelihoods and homes in order to 
participate in the communist system and assimilate to the 
wider society.42 In what can be termed an attempted cul-
tural genocide via assimilation, the reshaping of “Gypsy 
behaviour”43 in the long-range assimilation plans of the 
Communist Party resulted in active destruction of Roma 
settlements, creation of circumscribed Roma-only neigh-
bourhoods, censorship of civil liberties, and the implemen-
tation of Special Schools for Roma.44 Aft er the fall of the 
USSR in 1989, attacks against the Roma have intensifi ed, 
and “today, most Roma have abandoned their traditional 
way of life and are concentrated in low-income housing 
developments of outright ghettoes throughout Europe.”45 
Th e continued persecution hinges on the perception that 
Roma are racially distinct, which has been cemented in 
the rise of neo-Nazism and right-wing fascist groups, espe-
cially in Hungary and Slovakia. Th is rise in right-wing 
fundamentalism routinely precipitates in violent acts 
against Roma in segregated Roma neighbourhoods, both 
by non-Roma individuals as well as states as a whole,46 in 
the forms of shooting, stabbing, verbal and sexual assaults, 
and organized anti-Roma demonstrations, as well as the 
geographic segregation and racism in state institutions. As 
recently as 22 April 2012, ROMEA, the Roma media con-
sortium in the Czech Republic reported on a neo-Nazi rally 
in the Czech town of Břeclav that gathered upwards of 2000 
people chanting slogans such as “Where are those whores?,” 
“Gypsies, you’ve fucked up,” and “Let’s stop gypsy terror.”47 
Also, on 4 May 2012 ROMEA reposted that in late April, a 
young Roma man was killed with a crossbow shot to the 
head as the attacker shouted, “You black whores, I’ll kill 
you!” near Ostrava, Czech Republic.48 Sadly, these attacks 
are not restricted to the Czech Republic but have been 
widely reported on by Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch as occurring in many Eastern European 
states.
Notably, there have been the disturbing allegations of 
forced sterilization of Roma in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, 
Czech Republic, and Slovakia, which has been classifi ed by 
the Czech Republic Defender of Rights as “without hesita-
tion … a technique on the verge of meeting the attributes 
of a genocide.”49 In addition, the more systematic persecu-
tion and structural violence perpetrated against the Roma 
is evident in educational segregation, where children at 
the primary and secondary level are separated on the basis 
of their racialized categories into Roma and non-Roma 
(white) classrooms and schools. It is also evident in the 
presence of separate hospital wards for whites and Roma.50 
Th ese reactions against the Roma have been construed as 
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a profound “anti-gypsiism”51 that permeates all facets of 
daily life. France began expelling Roma citizens from its 
jurisdiction in 2009, with Italy following in 2011.52 Notably, 
most of the countries that have been enforcing such poli-
cies are part of the European Union, which is capitalized 
on by the Canadian government and used to argue that 
these countries are democratically sound and therefore 
cannot be producing legitimate refugees.53 Nonetheless, an 
offi  cial statement made by the European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights states that “segregation [of the Roma] 
is still evident in many EU member states, sometimes as a 
result of deliberate government policy.”54
Th us, as a reaction to widespread racism, segregation, 
and the recent rise in persecution, Roma citizens of the 
European Union have been seeking refuge in other coun-
tries around the world. In fact, the Roma are not new-
comers to Canada, and groups of Roma have been settled 
here since mid-19th century.55 Especially during the Cold 
War, many Roma arrived in Canada as political dissidents 
and were welcomed with open arms as Czech, Slovak, or 
Hungarian nationals, not as ethnic Roma. As Lee argues, it 
is very diffi  cult to ascertain Roma-specifi c immigration, as 
Roma ethnicity was not recorded, and there was also wide-
spread reluctance to identify as Roma.56 According to Lee, 
“overall the Roma population in Canada is estimated to be 
at least 80 000,”57 with over 90 per cent of Roma residing 
in the Greater Toronto Area in Ontario.58 Th ere has been 
steady migration to Canada through the 1990s and 2000s, 
and as persecution of the Roma continues to be a daily 
reality in Europe, Roma asylum claims will continue to be 
made.
While Canada presents itself as a benevolent nation wel-
coming newcomers and refugees with open arms, it has a 
long and troubled history of excluding undesirable migrants. 
Th e recent onslaught of Conservative rhetoric concern-
ing “bogus” and “fraudulent” refugees attacking Canada’s 
shores and taking advantage of its liberal social policies is 
not new.59 It is important to consider that while the cur-
rent rhetoric employed by the Conservative government is 
problematic, it is historically situated and is by no means 
the only rhetoric that has been promulgated by Canadian 
immigration and refugee policy throughout its history. 
Importantly, the actual total numbers of asylum claimants 
arriving at Canada’s shores are rather small, and Canada is 
not dealing with waves or fl oods of claimants who are here 
to take advantage of the refugee system. Th e total number 
of asylum seekers has not been increasing signifi cantly but 
has been hovering between 33,970 in 2009, 22,543 in 2010, 
24,981 in 2011, and 20,223 in 2012.60
Th e Treatment of Czech Roma in Canadian 
Legislation
Th e treatment of Czech Roma refugee claimants has been 
particularly problematic in the securiticization of recent 
Canadian responses to this group.  Th e visa imposition 
throughout the last 15 years on this group of refugee claim-
ants is explored in greater detail by Lefebvre61 and Levine-
Rasky, St. Clair, and Beaudoin,62 but in brief, visas for Czech 
travellers were fi rst imposed in 1998 to stem the large num-
bers of Roma making refugee claims in Canada. However, 
numbers of refugee claims actually rose aft er the imposition 
of the visa,63 as a result of the rise of overt post-Communist 
anti-Roma sentiments, by neo-Nazi groups as well as by the 
general populace. Th e visa requirement was then lift ed in 
November 2007. Th e Czech Republic joined the European 
Union on 1 May 2004 and held the European Union 
presidency in the fi rst half of 2009. Th us, the onus was on 
Canada to treat all European Union member states equally64 
and the visa requirement was subsequently dropped for a 
year and a half, only to be reinstated on 13 July 2009, to much 
outrage by the Czech government. However, the Canadian 
government explained their strategy of visa requirements 
on Czech nationals as a way to avoid bogus refugee claim-
ants who abuse the refugee system.65 Minister Kenney in 
particular stated that “the refugee claimants from Czechs 
make no sense because they could easily move to twenty-six 
other Western democracies in the European Union.”66 Th e 
rhetoric of the abuse of Canada’s immigration system, and 
of the Roma as queue jumpers who are clogging up the asy-
lum system, was bolstered by the Immigration and Refugee 
Board (IRB) 2009 Czech Fact-Finding Mission Report on 
State Protection,67 which has since been used to refute 90 per 
cent of Roma cases that come before the IRB.68 It should be 
noted that this report is missing from the public record and 
the follow-up 2011 report based on a Canadian delegation 
to the Czech Republic to determine country conditions has 
not been published. However, Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada itself has stated that “the imposition of visas on the 
Czech Republic and Mexico … [protects] the integrity of 
the asylum program” in Canada69 and is necessary to deter 
fraudulent refugees from coming to Canada. Interestingly, 
as of 14 November 2013, Citizenship and Immigration has 
announced that all visa requirements have been lift ed from 
the Czech Republic. As Chris Alexander, the new minister 
of citizenship and immigration stated, “Our confi dence in 
lift ing the visa requirement is further enhanced by Canada’s 
improvements to its asylum system, which will serve as an 
eff ective deterrence against unfounded asylum claims.”70 
With Roma asylum seeker numbers dropping and Canada’s 
economic relationship strengthening with the European 
Union, it remains to be seen what rhetoric will be put out 
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once statistics become available for the 2013 IRB refugee 
determination rates from the Czech Republic.
Bill C-31 and the “Bogus” Roma Refuge
Tabled on 16 February 2012 and known as the Protecting 
Canada’s Immigration System Act, Bill C-31 came into 
force on 15 December 2012. Bill C-31 is an amalgamation 
of two previous bills (Bill C-11 and Bill C-4), whose hard-
line natures have been subsumed in Bill C-31’s new provi-
sions, which have been presented as necessary in order to 
speed up Canada’s refugee determination system and erase 
the massive backlog of refugee claimants. On 9 May 2012 
the Conservative government introduced amendments 
to Bill C-31, which have the detention period for “irregu-
lar” migrants.71 However, the other problematic provi-
sions that aff ect Roma refugee claimants in particular were 
not amended before the bill became law. Th e overarching 
argument held by the Government and Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada is that “Canada’s asylum system is 
broken … Canada’s existing asylum system is crippled by an 
ever-increasing number of new unfounded claims,”72 which 
must be rooted out and removed.
In brief, the bill73 introduces numerous problematic 
changes to Canada’s immigration and refugee policy: the 
barring of persons who have been convicted of a crime pun-
ishable by 10 or more years in prison, which can exclude pol-
itical prisoners and activists (sections 101.2.a and 101.2.b); 
the revocation of permanent residence and the cessation of 
refugee status (sections 40.1 and 108.2); the creation of a cat-
egory of designated foreign nationals (sections 95.1 and 20.1) 
who will be ineligible for permanent residency status for fi ve 
years aft er their hearing based on their “irregular” means of 
arrival (section 20.2). Th ere is also the linkage between the 
terminology of “irregular arrival” and smuggling (sections 
20.1.1a and b); mandatory arrest and detention of designated 
foreign nationals over the age of 16 (section 3.2a and b); as 
well as vague and obscure ministerial powers such as in 
designating inadmissible foreign nationals and the impos-
ition of conditions by the minister (sections 25.3.1) and min-
isterial intervention at any time during the appeal process, 
which is to be set up at the Immigration and Refugee Board 
(section 110.1). However, the most problematic provision for 
the Roma claimants from Eastern Europe is the ministerial 
power in creating designated countries of origin, or “safe” 
countries. Refugee claims from spontaneous asylum seek-
ers who arrive from these designated countries of origin 
will run on diff erent, much shorter timelines than the rest 
of the refugee determination process (section 109.1). At the 
time of writing, section 109.1.1 of Bill C-31 amends section 
12 of the current Balanced Refugee Reform Act, stating:
109.1 (1) Th e Minister may, by order, designate a country, 
for the purposes of subsection 110(2) and section 111.1.
(2) Th e Minister may only make a designation
(a) in the case where the number of claims for refu-
gee protection made in Canada by nationals of the 
country in question in respect of which the Refugee 
Protection Division has made a fi nal determination 
is equal to or greater than the number provided for 
by order of the Minister,
(i) if the rate, expressed as a percentage, that is 
obtained by dividing the total number of claims 
made by nationals of the country in question that, 
in a fi nal determination by the Division during 
the period provided for in the order, are rejected 
or determined to be withdrawn or abandoned 
by the total number of claims made by nationals 
of the country in question in respect of which 
the Division has, during the same period, made 
a fi nal determination is equal to or greater than 
the percentage provided for in the order, or …
(b) in the case where the number of claims for refu-
gee protection made in Canada by nationals of the 
country in question in respect of which the Refugee 
Protection Division has made a fi nal determination 
is less than the number provided for by order of the 
Minister, if the Minister is of the opinion that in 
the country in question
(i) there is an independent judicial system,
(ii) basic democratic rights and freedoms are recog-
nized and mechanisms for redress are available 
if those rights or freedoms are infringed, and
(iii) civil society organizations exist.
Claimants who fall under the subsection of designated 
countries of origin have 15 calendar days to gain access to 
and retain counsel if they have the means to do so, fi le their 
Basis of Claim form and all supporting documents, which 
have to be translated. Th ey also do not have access to the 
newly created Refugee Appeal Division and can rely only on 
judicial review of their IRB decisions. Groups such as CCR 
and CARL have released offi  cial statements underlining 
that these timelines in section 109.1.1 are not realistic and 
will lead to less representation by counsel and more cases 
being denied.74 Importantly, section 109.1 of the bill stipu-
lates that such designations will be under the sole discretion 
of the minister, based on specifi c country of origin reports, 
such as the IRB Czech Fact-Finding Mission Report on State 
Protection.75 Th e country will be designated as a whole, with 
no provisions made for regional diff erences. Th ese desig-
nated or safe countries of origin are ones that supposedly 
“do not normally produce refugees, have a robust human 
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rights record and off er strong state protection … to their 
citizens.”76 Nevertheless, denying refugee claimants from 
these countries a fair determination process undermines 
Canada’s refugee policy much more that the supposed infl ux 
of “bogus” refugees jumping queues. Presupposing that 
entire countries can be designated as “safe” fails to recog-
nize the heterogeneity of experience in any nation, based on 
a person’s age, geographic location, sexual orientation, eth-
nic background, and myriad other factors. To presume that 
an entire country can be designated as “safe” for all groups 
is profoundly reductionist and allows for entire groups of 
refugee claimants to be labelled as “frauds” on the basis of 
hailing from a Designated Country of Origin.
Government Statements and Media Portrayals 
Surrounding Bill C-31
Since tabling Bill C-31 in February 2012, the Conservative 
Government has used the media in strategic ways in order 
to capitalize on the “bogus refugee” imagery. “To be blunt, 
Canada’s asylum system is broken,” Minister Kenney told 
reporters immediately aft er tabling the bill on 16 February 
2012. “[Th e previous] Act went a long way to addressing 
problems in our system, but it’s become clear that there are 
still some gaps and further reforms are needed. We need 
stronger measures that are closer to the original bill that 
we had tabled back in March of 2010.”77 Government crit-
ics immediately responded and stated that the bill is a “ser-
ious step backwards,”78 and that the notion of the so-called 
refugee queues is “an extravagant construction”79 rooted in 
the government’s rhetorical pursuit of fraudulent claims. In 
response to a piece in the Montreal Gazette from 2 March 
2012 entitled “Welcome to Canada—Unless We Change 
Our Mind,” Kenney responded, “Th e Protecting Canada’s 
Immigration System Act will make our refugee system fast 
and fair, ensuring that bona fi de refugees quickly receive 
Canada’s protection, and that those who abuse Canada’s 
generosity and do not require our protection are quickly 
removed.”80 Such rhetoric of “fairness,” “generosity,” and 
“abuse” of the system by fraudulent claimants is an under-
current of the reforms, and these discourses are enshrined in 
Bill C-31 itself, with clauses such as “manifestly unfounded” 
claims (clause 57), or “designated foreign nationals” (clause 
10). According to Kenney, the apparent dysfunction of the 
current asylum system must be overhauled, and special 
interest groups have vested interests in keeping the status 
quo.81 A swift  response to these allegations as well as to 
Bill C-31 itself was mounted by a variety of these so-called 
special interest groups, such as Amnesty International, 
Human Rights Watch, Roma Community Centre, CARL, 
CCR, Campaign against Bill C-31, and the Canadian Civil 
Liberties Association, in the form of press conferences, 
offi  cial statements, and op-ed pieces in the popular press 
such as the Montreal Gazette, Embassy,82 Toronto Star,83 
Global News,84 and the Huffi  ngton Post.85 Th e responses 
continued in the media, and the failure of proper investiga-
tion into “safe countries” was called into question.86
Th e treatment of Roma refugee claimants in particular 
has been problematic, as this rhetoric has worked to cement 
the association between the fraudulent refugee and the Roma 
refugee claimant. Fawn in particular examines how “Roma 
are iconoclastic for domestic and foreign perceptions of … 
national identity.”87 In particular, Kenney’s rhetoric has 
focused on the idea that the Roma are prototypical “bogus” 
refugees who organize in particular ways so that they can 
fl ood the already backlogged asylum system in Canada and 
that their numbers have been steadily increasing from 2010. 
In a 22 April 2012 National Post article, Kenney stated, “We 
tried to circulate brochures explaining ‘Th is is not the way 
you immigrate to Canada,’ and it’s had no impact,” add-
ing that the fl ood of asylum seekers is “highly organized” 
and “not at all spontaneous.”88 Th e placement of billboards 
in Hungary, warning people of deportation if they come to 
Canada, shows just how serious the government has been 
in trying to limit Roma migration into Canada.89 Kenney’s 
statements that the Czech Republic and Hungary will be 
placed on the “safe counties” lists and the act of placing the 
two countries in the top fi ve countries assessed for increased 
Canadian Border Services Agency removal warrants90 fur-
ther add to the idea that claimants from these countries are 
not bona fi de refugees and are therefore subject to removal. 
Th is rhetoric is being promulgated despite the fact that refu-
gee claimants do continue to successfully claim asylum in 
Canada from these countries, albeit in small numbers, as 
shown by recent decisions such as Rezmuvez v Canada, con-
cerning a Hungarian Roma claimant at the Federal Court 
of Appeal, in which the judge stated in paragraph 12 that 
“the Board failed to review or acknowledge the recent evi-
dence which the applicants describe in their memorandum 
a follows: ‘there has been a severe upswing of extremism 
directed against Roma and further that there is extensive 
evidence of the government’s shortcomings in actually pre-
venting violence against Roma.’”91
Th e Roma community and advocates around Canada 
have mobilized a fairly successful campaign against these 
government statements, and some have received extensive 
coverage in popular media.92 In particular, aft er parlia-
mentary testimonies from Roma advocates and lawyers 
on 3 May 2012, the Tribute93 published a piece decrying 
the ministerial powers outlined in the proposed Bill C-31, 
even aft er the announced amendments on 9 May 2012. Th is 
piece prompted a swift  response from Minister Kenney in 
the form of an editorial, in which he proclaimed that he is 
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not destroying the immigration and refugee system as had 
been stated. According to Kenney, “We are strengthening 
our system by cracking down on the abuse of Canada’s gen-
erosity by human smugglers, bogus asylum claimants, fake 
immigration marriages, crooked immigration consultants 
and immigration queue-jumpers … Canada’s immigra-
tion and refugee system is the most fair and generous in the 
world, and will continue to be so under the new, improved 
system. Overheated, ideological rhetoric from special inter-
est groups does a great disservice to Canada’s tradition of 
openness and generosity.”94
Th is idea that Canada’s refugee determination system is 
fair, just, and generous does not match the provisions set 
out in Bill C-31, which will negatively aff ect certain groups 
of asylum seekers, essentially shutting them out of the same 
timelines aff orded to other claimants and discriminat-
ing against them on the basis of their country of origin.95 
However, since the Roma fi t the prototypical fi gure of the 
“bogus” refugee so well, it becomes easier to justify deny-
ing them the same process that other asylum seekers will 
be given under the guise of protecting Canada’s refugee sys-
tem from people who are known frauds.96 Using such infer-
ences to bolster government reform in times of decreasing 
national security, unstable economic climates, and fears of 
border infi ltration and terrorism works to justify increasing 
state interventions and the performance of sovereign power, 
under the discourse of welcoming certain people and shut-
ting out others, whose exclusion is useful for these state pro-
jects. It would appear that for current immigration offi  cials, 
“none is too many”97 when processing Roma refugee claims 
from the Czech Republic and the rest of Europe.
State Performativity and Discourses on Refugees: 
Times of Exception and Exceptional Times
Th e rhetoric of the “bogus” refugee acts as a catalyst for 
legislative change and shows its profound impact on the 
creation of a binary between the “deserving good refugees” 
versus the “irregular uncontrollable asylum seekers,” who 
are constructed to represent threats to sovereign borders 
and the nation state. In this light, the concept of state per-
formativity is useful when analyzing recent changes made 
to the Canadian refugee determination system in the quest 
to root out all allegedly manifestly unfounded and fraudu-
lent claims. Th e newly implemented Bill C-31 bolsters the 
potent discourses of “fraud” and of the “bogus” refugees 
threatening Canada’s borders that are present in the rhet-
oric of Minister Kenney and the Canadian Conservative 
Government.98 According to the government, the apparent 
dysfunction of the current asylum system must be over-
hauled, and special interest groups have vested interests in 
keeping the status quo.99
Such movements point to the weakening of state sovereign 
power and the need to perform in spectacular ways, in order 
to bolster state infl uence and work towards nation-building 
projects. In particular, the creation of abject Others works to 
police and discipline the wider populace,100 and it also justi-
fi es a crusade against the created common enemies that are 
alleged to threaten our established ways of life. In particular, 
“the accumulation of aff ective value shapes the surfaces of 
bodies and worlds”101 and creates a world order in which 
it is perfectly justifi ed to unilaterally decide who is a fraud 
or a terrorist and therefore inadmissible to our countries. 
As Butler argues, in times when sovereignty is threatened, 
“the law is suspended in the name of the ‘sovereignty’ of the 
nation, where ‘sovereignty’ denotes the task of any state to 
preserve and protect its own territoriality.”102 Th e state does 
this by detaining those that have been deemed a threat, as 
well as denying them due process and fair judicial review. 
With the creation of the Designated Countries of Origin in 
Bill C-31 and by making it very diffi  cult to fi le a claim under 
the new timelines, certain groups of asylum seekers will be 
excluded from the system and returned to their countries of 
origin, under the rhetoric of unclogging Canada’s refugee 
system from persons about whom it is already known that 
they are fraudulent refugees.103
In this focus on the constructed binary between the 
“good refugee,” who remains in a refugee camp until selected 
and resettled in Canada, versus the “fraudulent, queue-
jumping asylum seeker,” the concept of Agamben’s inclu-
sive exclusion104 continues to inform how we divide and 
separate ourselves from others. As Hansen and Stepputat 
posit, these formulations are centred on “the fi gure, the out-
law, the Friedlos, or the convict, [who] was historically the 
symbol of the outside upon whose body and life the bound-
aries of the political community could be built.”105 Th e con-
cretization of certain bodies into the abject Others justifi es 
increasingly draconian ranges of intervention, not only in 
material realms but also in the discourses used in the justi-
fi cation of terror, incarceration, and violence against these 
abject bodies. In particular, the naturalizing of diff erences 
and the intensifi cation of violence perpetrated against cer-
tain bodies has been seen as just and justifi ed in the violent 
responses to the 9/11 attacks, whether against the Muslim 
terrorist or the asylum seeker threatening sovereign borders. 
Th e need to protect the threatened sovereignty of a Western 
nation against the attacks of the terrorists, both from the 
outside and in our midst, creates regimes that rational-
ize state interventions in a climate of fear. For the current 
Canadian government, a powerful symbol in vogue is the 
“bogus refugee.”
As state sovereignty becomes more contested, the “precar-
ious construction and maintenance of localized sovereign 
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power through exercise of actual and ‘spectral’ violence, 
transmitted through rumours, tales, and reputations”106 
exhibits a peculiar paradox. On the one hand, sovereign 
borders are becoming much more fl exible and porous, with 
slippages and frictions in the intersections of the global and 
the local. On the other, in an eff ort to counteract this phe-
nomenon, governments are moving to more rigid regimes 
of control and toward an ossifi cation of specifi c enemy fi g-
ures into easily understandable and predictable depictions. 
Th e border is construed as a concrete thing, regardless of 
its inherent porosity, adding yet more ammunition to the 
rhetoric of illegal border crossing and of fraudulent asy-
lum seekers looking to fl eece the benevolent Canada. In the 
recent growth of cross-border migration management, cer-
tain mobilities are made legitimate while others are made 
abject.107 Th e authority of the state and its legitimacy must 
be cleverly manufactured and constantly supported,108 and 
the border is a particular locale where sovereignty intersects 
with notions of threat, security, and power. Certain bodies 
thus become “the agents of governmentality,”109 and the 
bodies of the asylum seeker must therefore be controlled, 
managed, and used in the performance of sovereignty and 
security at the border and beyond.
Importantly, as Andreas reminds us, “public perception 
is powerfully shaped by the images of the border which 
politicians, law enforcement agencies, and the media pro-
ject.”110 Th e fi gure of the outlaw, the abject Other, the Roma 
refugee claimant, is lambasted and paraded for the citizenry 
to see, a sombre reminder not to be like them in order to 
keep the already fraying fabric of sovereignty together in 
these trying, terror-ridden times. Such spectacles of means, 
whether in the creation of extra-legal immigration deten-
tion facilities, extraordinary rendition, or draconian legis-
lation, make clear “the insistence on a power that must be 
displayed.”111 In looking for “fraudulent” asylums seekers, 
there is a profound reaffi  rmation of borders and the need 
to strengthen sovereignty in these uncertain times.112 In 
addition, Buck-Morss posits that the particularly power-
ful trope of Western innocence construes the benevolent 
nation as being under threat by outside tides and waves 
of irregular migrants, terrorists, and human smugglers.113 
Interventions against terrorists and “fraudulent” asylum 
seekers become justifi ed in the creation of a climate in 
which the very fabric of social life is under threat at the 
hand of the abject Other. Th e Roma come to stand in for 
the dangerous migrant who is lazy and ungovernable, one 
who has come to take advantage of Canada’s generosity. Th e 
Roma continue to assault Canada’s borders with a steady 
persistence, so the state creates legal barriers that facilitate 
faster determination of unfounded and “bogus” claims and 
sure deportation back to Europe. Th e Roma do not fi t into 
the conception of the modern Canadian state, and as Aiken 
has argued, the undesirable migrant Other is seen as dan-
gerous to sovereignty.114
Further, the creation of a particular form of “we” gives 
rise to the justifi cation of the attacks on refugees on the 
grounds of humanity and the necessity to uphold and fi ght 
for ideals, such as enduring freedom and democracy.115 Th e 
integrity of what it means to be part of the Western world, 
and what it may mean to be Canadian, is viewed to be 
under attack by those who are not with us but against us. As 
Vertovec argues, “Civil servants and politicians refl ect, draw 
on, or manipulate popular notions of national versus alien 
culture to develop policies and manage state institutions … 
the issues surrounding migration stimulate, manifest, and 
reproduce cultural politics.”116 Th us, as frontiers become 
blurred and borders become untied from specifi c geopolit-
ical locales, media representations bolster the state ideology 
and discourses, especially if the state is adept at tapping into 
cultural fears about a particular abject group. If the govern-
ment can prove that the Roma do not have a real, legitimate 
basis on which to structure their refugee claim, why should 
they then come and take advantage in Canada? In Canada, 
“bogus” refugees are construed as not only undermining 
Canada’s refugee determination system but also as posing a 
threat to a labile and easily disturbed economic equilibrium. 
Th e government capitalizes on the trope of the immigrant 
as the one who steals our jobs and takes advantage of the 
welfare state at the “proper” citizens’ expense.117
Aff ective responses lie at the heart of the discourses and 
rhetoric that is being used to mobilize popular beliefs and 
bolster cultural constructions of our perceived enemies in 
the performance of state sovereignty and the justifi cation of 
the control and expulsion of certain bodies. Th e concretiza-
tion of borders, and the hyping up of border anxieties, as well 
as designating which bodies matter and who the perceived 
enemies are, is a very aff ective and millennial phenomenon, 
one that speaks to our hopes and fears in an unstable and 
shift ing world. As Ahmed118 cogently explores, emotions 
align with particular bodies, and aff ect sticks in very par-
ticular ways to those that have been constructed as useful 
in bolstering regimes and creating truths about the enemies 
around us. In immigration policy and the ever-present dis-
course of fear and threat of being overrun by undocument-
able asylum seekers, Ahmed also points out that “the fi g-
ure of the bogus asylum seeker is detached from particular 
bodies: any incoming bodies could be bogus, such that their 
‘endless’ arrival is anticipated as the scene of ‘our injury.’”119 
Th us, we are constantly waiting for the bogus claimants 
to arrive, ready to interrogate them and prove their fraud 
in the crusade to protect Canadian refugee determination 
system from the waves of “bogus” refugees, because even 
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before they arrive and fi le a refugee claim, we already know 
that they are a fraud, and it is only a matter of time before 
they will be found out and removed.120
Importantly, since any body can be a threat, these 
objects of fear and dread become interchangeable for one 
another.121 Th us, the Muslim terrorists become the immi-
grants who steal our jobs and make our pensions harder 
to get in these trying neo-liberal times, and in turn they 
become the fraudulent asylum seekers jumping queues and 
taking advantage of Canada. Such narratives of fear become 
the narratives of possibility, installing particular truths and 
regimes of governance. It is the not-yet-ness of feared bod-
ies,122 the uncontrollable nature of the threat that is the 
most potent. Immigrants and asylum seekers are dangerous 
because they are hard to control and thus must be detained 
and managed. We can never be sure of exactly when the 
asylum seeker arrives, and that uncertainty creates much 
anxiety in the state apparatus of the border. Th ere is a pro-
found fear of mobility and of the uncontrollable because 
“the asylum seeker is ‘like’ the terrorist, an agent of fear, 
who may destroy ‘our home.’”123 Such notions of an injury 
to the nation manifests in Canada through our “concern 
about cultural identity and cultural loss, the fear that some-
one is robbing us of our culture and that [our] authenticity 
will be destroyed.”124 Th e particular fl avour of millennial 
apocalypticism that manifests in these fears is seen to be 
solvable only through strict policing and discipline of the 
abject. Th us, the paranoia and states of emergency organ-
ize and control the unclean, uncontrollable, dangerous, and 
disruptive bodies.125 Th e theatre of conspicuous perform-
ance of power manifests in the equating on one particular 
group of asylum seekers to being dangerous, fraudulent, 
and unwelcome, in a high-profi le spectacle of government 
power through new legislation, “safe country of origin” lists, 
and offi  cial government statements. Th us, the performance 
of state sovereign power, which is implicit in Canada’s Bill 
C-31, is contingent on the spectacle of capitalizing on the 
aff ective responses to rhetoric of “fraud” and of “bogus” 
refugees threatening to invade our borders and destroy our 
Canadian identity and way of life.
Conclusions
With the 16 February 2012 introduction and 15 December 
2012 implementation of Bill C-31, profound changes to 
Canada’s immigration and refugee policy have come swift ly. 
I have argued that the particular discourses of “fraud” and 
“bogus” that underpin the supposed need for this harsher 
legislation stem from the increased precarity of sovereign 
power, as the nation must perform a particular spectacle 
in order to maintain its authority and control. Th e asylum 
seeker comes to embody the ultimate threat to Canada the 
Benevolent, and if they make it past the increasing deter-
rents along the way to asylum, they must be dealt with 
swift ly, whether by being turned away at the border, exped-
ited through the asylum process, or incarcerated in deten-
tion centres or even geographically removed locales. Th e 
restructuring of Canada’s refugee regime will have lasting 
repercussions for those fl eeing persecution and wishing 
to fi nd a safe haven in Canada. Th e case of Roma asylum 
seekers is particularly cogent as the Roma have come to 
embody the “fraudulent” and “bogus” refugee coming to 
take advantage of the Canadian welfare state. With asylum-
seeker and government-assisted refugee numbers dropping, 
the current Conservative government of Canada has used 
the Roma to bolster their ideologies about which refugees 
are wanted and have argued that it is precisely because of 
the bogus refugee that further reforms to the Canadian 
immigration and refugee system are needed. It is import-
ant to stress that the purpose of this article is not to vilify 
the current Conservative government, as, throughout his-
tory, Canada has had rather harsh immigration regimes, 
regardless of the political party in power. However, what 
is very clear about Bill C-31 is that the hard-line measures 
it introduces presuppose which refugee claimants are the 
proper refugees who are welcome and which ones are inher-
ently “fraudulent” and must be dealt with accordingly. Such 
presuppositions are not in accordance with international 
law, and Canada appears to be shirking its responsibil-
ity to provide due process to persons seeking asylum at its 
borders. It remains to be seen whether Bill C-31 will with-
stand impending Charter challenges126 and whether it will 
be deemed constitutional to deny a person asylum on the 
basis of the discretion of someone like Minister Kenney and 
his apparently keen ability to pick out the bogus among the 
masses.
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